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Abstract. Security, networking and prefetching are typical examples of
concerns which crosscut system-level C applications. While a careful de-
sign can help to address these concerns, they frequently become an issue
at runtime, especially if avoiding server downtime is important. Vulner-
abilities caused by buﬀer overﬂows and double-free bugs are frequently
discovered after deployment, thus opening critical breaches in running
applications. Performance issues also often arise at run time: in the case
of Web caches, e.g., a prefetching strategy may be required to increase
performance. Aspect-oriented programming is an appealing solution to
solve these issues. However, none of the current dynamic aspect sys-
tems is expressive and eﬃcient enough to support them properly in the
context of C applications. Arachne is a new aspect system speciﬁcally
designed to address these issues. Its aspect language allows aspects to
be expressed concisely using a sequence construct for quantiﬁcation over
function calls and accesses through variable aliases. Arachne enables as-
pects to be woven “on the ﬂy” in running legacy applications. We show
how these abilities can be used to prevent security breaches, to modular-
ize the replacement of network protocols by more eﬃcient ones, and to
introduce prefetching in Web caches. We present two formal semantics for
Arachne: one which deﬁnes in abstract terms the main properties of the
sequence construct, and a second one which enables reasoning about the
actual implementation. Following a detailed presentation of Arachne’s
implementation, we give performance evaluations showing that Arachne
is fast enough to extend high-performance applications, such as the Squid
Web cache.
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1 Introduction
Real-world applications are typically made of a number of diﬀerent concerns.
System-level C applications are no exception: security considerations, network
concerns, caching and prefetching concerns are usually scattered in the entire
program code. Furthermore, there is a strong need to isolate and manipulate
these concerns at run time, especially in server environments whose downtime
must be minimal. Security breaches such as double-free bugs and buﬀer overﬂows
might be discovered after server deployment. Hardware resources might turn
out to be undersized calling, for instance, for use of more appropriate network
protocols or for the inclusion of prefetching strategies within Web caches. The
Web cache Squid [1] is a typical illustration of this situation. First, we have found
that several such concerns are scattered over large portions of the code of Squid.
Second, such a Web cache should not be stopped in order to avoid performance
loss by keeping caches ﬁlled continuously. Similarly, a buﬀer overﬂow should be
ﬁxed without incurring server downtime.
Potentially aspect-oriented programming (AOP) [2] should allow one to prop-
erly modularize and manipulate crosscutting concerns such as those we have
identiﬁed for the Squid Web cache. Furthermore, Squid is designed to be as
eﬃcient as possible and therefore exploits any suitable operating system and
hardware particularity. Its code base is therefore diﬃcult to understand and
manipulate, thus hinting at the use of specialized aspect systems instead of tra-
ditional means for modularization. However, these concerns exhibit three char-
acteristics which make diﬃcult the application of basic aspect technology. First,
any of these concerns expose intricate relationships between execution points:
network protocols, e.g., are most concisely expressed in terms of sequences of
execution points, not individual ones. Second, as motivated above, the concerns
need to be manipulated “on the ﬂy” once the application is running. A dynamic
aspect weaver is therefore needed. Finally, their lack of modularization at design
time typically results from performance considerations. Use of aspect-oriented
(AO) techniques in this context must only degrade eﬃciency to a very small
extent.
To our knowledge, none of the current aspect systems for C is suitable for
the modularization of such concerns. In particular, no existing aspect systems
meets the three requirements introduced above, e.g., dynamic weavers often trade
eﬃciency for expressivity. This paper summarizes our attempt to treat such con-
cerns as aspects using the Arachne system. The core to our solution is a new
expressive aspect language providing a sequence construct which allows us to
quantify over function call events and access to local aliases of global variables.
A main contribution of this paper is to show how sequences allow us to facili-
tate nontrivial evolution tasks of legacy systems software. Technically, we show
how they support the proper modularization of the four concerns introduced
above. Its implementation is based on binary code rewriting techniques and al-
lows aspects to be woven dynamically in running C applications (which uses
implementation techniques quite diﬀerent from load-time or dynamic weaving
in, e.g., Java-based aspect systems).
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the motivating concerns
we identiﬁed within Squid. Section 3 shows how to modularize these concerns as
aspects and presents the Arachne aspect language. The language is deﬁned in
Sect. 3, where two formal semantics for this language are presented: an abstract
one deﬁning the main properties of the language and an implementation-level one
that allows us to reason about the code executed by the Arachne tool. Section 5
describes Arachne’s implementation. Section 6 assesses the performance of our
implementation. In Sect. 7, we discuss related work, and we conclude in Sect. 8.
2 Motivation
Legacy C applications involve multiple crosscutting concerns. Many of them
remain challenging, both in terms of expressiveness required to handle them
properly in an AO language and in terms of constraints posed on the weaver. In
this section we discuss four such concerns in C applications: memory manage-
ment problems caused by double-free bugs, buﬀer overﬂows, switching network
protocols and Web cache prefetching. The security threats posed by double-
free bugs and buﬀer overﬂows are typically scattered over the entire application.
Since guarding all buﬀers against overﬂows or monitoring memory manipulations
might considerably decrease performance, administrators are often left with no
other option than accepting the trade-oﬀs between security and performance
chosen at design time of an application. Likewise, switching network protocols
is a real problem for administrators facing bandwidth problems. Prefetching is
another well-known crosscutting concern that traditionally require similar trade-
oﬀs [3, 4]. Since prefetching aims at increasing performance, prefetching aspects
make only sense with an eﬃcient weaver. Yet, it is still diﬃcult to modularize
these four concerns in today’s AO languages. In this section, we ﬁrst describe
the contexts in which the diﬀerent concerns arise before giving evidence of their
crosscutting nature and ﬁnally motivating the lack of appropriate means of ex-
pression in current AO languages.
2.1 Double-Free Bugs
Unix systems introduced the brk system call, allowing programs to dynamically
resize the heap. Later on, the standard C library has provided the malloc inter-
face that acts as a layer between applications and the system. It allocates large
chunks of memory through brk and fragments these chunks for the application,
thus providing a more eﬃcient and ﬁner-grained interface for dynamic memory
manipulation.
For performance reasons the GNU C library performs no sanity check on
use of the malloc interface: freeing a nonallocated memory chunk leads to an
implementation-dependant behavior, most frequently a segmentation fault. This
has widely been exploited by hackers to build denial of service attacks [5]. In or-
der to deal both with performance and fragmentation issues, the GNU C library
implementation stores information such as the list of free chunks, the chunk size
and other management information within the heap itself. If an application tries
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to free a nonallocated memory chunk, hackers can exploit the GNU C mem-
ory layout to take control of the application by corrupting its memory [6]. To
protect against these so-called double-free bugs (which occur frequently because
of erroneously freeing a memory location twice), a safe implementation of the
malloc interface, which can be selected at load time, is provided by the GNU
C library. Nevertheless, this safe implementation turns out to be very ineﬃcient
and is rarely if ever used. Hence, administrators discovering that an application
contains a double-free bug cannot ensure security without deploying a bug-free
version of the application. This requires the application to be stopped at the
cost of potentially trashing the work in progress.
Despite the fact that Squid implements its own heap manipulation API,1
it has recently been proven to be vulnerable to double-free bugs [7]. In Squid,
memory allocation is a crosscutting concern: 71% of the .c ﬁles, which constitute
its source code, contain direct references to the heap manipulation API.
In order to ensure continuous servicing without hurting performance, san-
ity checks on double-free calls should be limited to untrusted code (i.e., external
libraries) or to periods when the environment is known to be hostile. Adding san-
ity checks to memory manipulation code may aﬀect an entire application source
code as dynamic memory allocation is highly common in string and buﬀer ma-
nipulations. In this case, an AO system is likely to permit users to improve on the
lengthy and error-prone process of manually adding sanity checks. Furthermore,
it should be helpful to address the security versus performance trade-oﬀ.
2.2 Buﬀer Overﬂows
In C, the size of an array is ﬁxed at allocation time. According to ISO and
ANSI standards [8], an invalid array access, i.e., an access out of the bounds of
the array, does not result in an immediate error but leads to an implementation-
dependent behavior. These vulnerabilities are increasingly exploited by computer
worms such as CodeRed [9, 10], Slammer [11, 12] and Blaster [13, 14], and cause
billions of dollars worth of damage [15]. Today, about 50% of vulnerabilities
reported by CERT [16] arise from buﬀer overﬂows, and buﬀer-overﬂow attacks
present the most common security attacks on software systems [17, 18].
A typical buﬀer-overﬂow attack tries to modify the memory by injecting code
and altering the control ﬂow so that the attacker gains control of the machine
[19]. The most common buﬀer-overﬂow attack, the so-called stack smashing,
overwrites the return address of a function on the stack with an address pointing
to previously inserted malicious code (Fig. 1). This overwriting of the return
address is possible as the program does not check if input exceeds the bounds
of the buﬀer, and thus the attacker can overwrite code adjacent to the buﬀer.
Once the function returns, the control is handed to the malicious code, and
the attacker may get control over the machine [20]. A simple echo server in C
containing such a buﬀer-overﬂow vulnerability is shown in Fig. 2. The code lacks
1 Squid can also be conﬁgured to use its own heap manipulation routines on top of
GNU malloc.
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(pointing to malicious code)Return Address
Fig. 1. Buﬀer-overﬂow attack overwriting the return address of a function
void echo() {
char* in = malloc(255);
gets(in); /*read user input*/
printf("%is\n",in); /*display it*/
free(in);
}
Fig. 2. Echo server in C with buﬀer-overﬂow vulnerability
a test whether the user input exceeds the size of the array, and an attacker could
easily exploit this vulnerability as described.
Therefore, it is crucial to ensure every access to a buﬀer to be in its bounds.
But bound-checking is error-prone and easily forgotten, and it is infeasible to de-
tect all buﬀer-overﬂow vulnerabilities by statically analyzing code [20]. Several
buﬀer overﬂow detectors have thus been proposed. Some of these approaches do
not protect against all attacks, like StackGuard [21]. This approach is based on
placing a dummy value between the stack data and the return address and then
checking whether it has been altered or not. Thus, it just detects attacks over-
writing everything along the stack. Bound-checkers, on the other hand, detect
all buﬀer-overﬂow attacks as they check all buﬀer accesses. But approaches like
Cyclone [22] or CCured [23], which are based on bound-checking, imply changes
to the code. Cyclone is a “safe dialect of C” [22]. To prevent safety violations,
the approach requires a subset of the C language to be used, e.g., by restrict-
ing pointer arithmetic, and the corresponding compiler performs static analysis
and inserts run-time checks. CCured is a program transformation system that
statically analyzes the program by classifying pointers and, depending on the
classiﬁcation, also adds run-time checks. Compilers have also been proposed
that enforce proper array access by bound-checking [15, 24]2 without requiring
code changes. But even the most eﬃcient of these compilers, CRED [15], incur
an overhead of up to 130%. Moreover, most frequently used C compilers, like
the gcc compiler, do not support bound-checking.
2 http://sourceforge.net/projects/boundschecking/
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Also, with respect to performance, most approaches are too generic. They
check every buﬀer access, even if the environment is not hostile and there is no
vulnerability. However, as bound-checking is expensive, it should only run on
buﬀer-overﬂow vulnerabilities [25].
Nowadays, administrators discovering a buﬀer-overﬂow vulnerability in a run-
ning application are mostly left with no other option than stopping the appli-
cation and restarting a bug-free version, as done in Squid [26]. However, this
technique does not conserve the continuous service property required by appli-
cations like the Squid Web cache. Furthermore, by stopping the application, the
administrator has no means to know whether and how the vulnerability has been
exploited, and thus this technique entails an important loss of information.
Bound-checking code tends to crosscut the entire application. In Squid, bound-
checking code can be found in any of the 104 .c ﬁles of its source code. Of the
57,635 lines composing these .c ﬁles, at least 485 relate to bound-checking.
This problem fails to be handled properly in current aspect languages since
they lack the ability to trigger advices upon access made through the alias of a
variable. Furthermore, many AO systems oﬀer only static weaving capabilities,
preventing the administrator from choosing the trade-oﬀ between security and
performance that suits his needs.
2.3 TCP to UDP Protocol
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [27] is the primary method of the
World Wide Web to transfer information over the Internet. The most frequently
used communication protocol underlying HTTP is the Transmission Control Pro-
tocol (TCP) [28]. TCP is a connection-oriented protocol ensuring reliable com-
munication by explicitly setting up and tearing down connections. While TCP
is used as the underlying transport protocol of HTTP, it is not well-suited for
short-lived connections exchanging only little data. However, short interactions
comprise a signiﬁcant amount of Web traﬃc. According to a study conducted
on the soccer World Cup Web site of 1998 [29], the average request size is about
4 KB, and there are results that 40% of the Web traﬃc can even ﬁt into a single
datagram of 1500 bytes, making up the size of a maximum transfer unit (MTU)
of Ethernet [30]. Thus, the cost of a Web interaction is dominated by data
exchanged for control purposes of the TCP connection rather than the actual
requested data. Furthermore, HTTP 1.1 has introduced persistent connections,
allowing a client to retrieve multiple pages from the same server through the
same TCP connection. However, the number of simultaneous TCP connections
is limited by operating systems, and thus servers have a strong incentive to close
HTTP connections as soon as possible.
Therefore, as also supported in [30, 31, 32], it seems beneﬁcial to use the User
Datagram Protocol (UDP) [33]. UDP incurs much less overhead for connection
establishment than TCP as the underlying transport protocol of HTTP for short-
lived connections and thereby reduces the overhead induced by TCP.
In spite of the corresponding potential performance gains, the existence of a
large number of legacy Web applications and the corresponding adaptation costs
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Fig. 3. Typical usage of the TCP and UDP APIs
have hindered widespread adoption of this solution. In particular, a complete
redesign of legacy applications is typically not reasonable. Besides the corre-
sponding development costs, deployment of the modiﬁed applications is prob-
lematic. Existing approaches to application deployment require stopping the
legacy Web application to switch the protocol. This, however, does not satisfy
the continuous servicing property inherent in such applications and, for exam-
ple, in the case of an e-commerce Web server, causes a direct loss of money.
Therefore, one may swap the application between diﬀerent machines to avoid
shutting down the service, but this requires redundant servers, which are often
not aﬀordable for small companies. For wide acceptance, a HTTP dialect using
UDP as transport protocol should thus be deployable on demand at run time.
In addition, replacing TCP by UDP is relatively diﬃcult in an application.
The choice of a transport protocol is usually based on standards believed to
be everlasting and is made at an early design stage. Hence, no particular eﬀort
is made to localize this design decision in a single piece of code. For example,
despite a modularization eﬀort, the TCP API provided by the operating system
is used directly in 7 of the 104 .c source ﬁles of the Squid Web cache.
As shown in Fig. 3, the TCP API is built around a set of C functions to
be invoked sequentially by the application [34]. In a properly written program,
TCP functions are ﬁrst used to establish the connection (typically with socket,
connect, bind and listen), exchange data through the connection (typically
with read and write) and then close it (typically close). Similarly, UDP appli-
cations ﬁrst direct the operating system to dedicate the appropriate resources to
exchange data (typically with socket and bind), then exchange data through
these resources (typically with sendto and recvfrom) before releasing them (typ-
ically with close). Hence, the problem is not only diﬃcult because TCP-related
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function invocations are scattered but also because the relative order of each in-
vocation is important in order to map it onto the appropriate UDP function. Fur-
thermore, there can be several connections at the same time, i.e., several clients
that connect with one server, and each connection can be in a diﬀerent state.
2.4 From Fetching to Prefetching
Operations like retrieving a ﬁle on a local disk or over the Web can be sped
up if the underlying software anticipates user requests and fetches documents in
advance of explicit requests. Such prefetching schemes diﬀer from one another by
how they predict future user requests. These “oracles” actually prevent a clean
encapsulation of prefetching in a single module communicating with the rest of
the application through well-deﬁned interfaces since predictions are based on
information meant to be private to other modules. In addition, it is obvious that
there is no universally perfect oracle [35]. A statically linked prefetching module
is therefore inappropriate; instead, prefetching modules along with the necessary
oracles should be loaded and unloaded on the ﬂy. Because of their crosscutting
nature, prefetching modules including such oracles are better written with as-
pects, as motivated by Coady et al. for ﬁle prefetching in the FreeBSD OS [3]
and our previous work considering the Squid Web cache [4].
Despite potential performance improvements, prefetching also increases re-
source consumption (e.g., network prefetching consumes local storage and band
width). When the need for such resources is too high, prefetching computation
competes for them against regular user requests and slows down their treatment
instead of speeding it up. In such cases, prefetching should therefore be temporar-
ily disabled. Squid, for instance, essentially manages ﬁle descriptors, a resource
only available in a limited quantity. A ﬁle descriptor is used by the underlying
operating system and applications to describe a network connection or a ﬁle on
the disk. Squid’s ﬁle descriptor management is based on a global variable that
tracks the number of ﬁle descriptors currently in use. By comparing its value
with the maximum number of ﬁle descriptors allowed by the operating system,
it is possible to evaluate whether prefetching should be disabled or activated.
Using current AO technology, enabling/disabling of prefetching depending on
the number of open ﬁle descriptors would be handled within advice by explic-
itly managing a corresponding state and triggering the corresponding actions.
This is bad practice because it impedes both readability and maintainability. A
mechanism is needed within the aspect language to restrict advice execution at
times where resource usage is too high.
3 An Expressive Aspect Language for System
Programming in C
While AOP is an obvious choice to tackle the crosscutting concerns introduced
above, none of the existing AO systems provides explicit support for some of
their essential elements, in particular, references to aliases which are local to a
function, and joinpoint sequences for protocols.
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In this section we introduce a new aspect language for system programming
in C that allows such crosscutting concerns to be expressed concisely. In order
to make this point, we ﬁrst revisit the examples by concisely “aspectizing” them
using our language. (Note that our aspect language is expressive in the sense that
it enables the concise deﬁnition of certain types of aspects, especially compared
to other tools for system-level manipulations, but it is not necessarily more ex-
pressive than existing approaches in a language-theoretic sense.) We then deﬁne
the joinpoint model underlying our language precisely, followed by the deﬁnition
of its syntax and informal semantics. Its formal semantics is the subject of the
following section.
3.1 Example Crosscutting Concerns Revisited
We now revisit the concerns discussed in Sect. 2 in order to show our language
in action and to give evidence that it allows such concerns to be concisely modu-
larized. Our motivating examples are reordered following increasing complexity
of the language constructs involved.
Double-Free Bugs. The aspect shown in Fig. 4 detects double-free bugs. It uses
two sets, addMalloc and addFree, which are initially empty to collect addresses
that have been allocated and freed as exempliﬁed by the ﬁrst advice. The sec-
ond advice checks whether these sets are consistent when free(buffer) is to be
called. First, when the current address has already been freed previously, the ad-
vice terminates the execution of the application. Second, when buffer does not
belong to addMalloc, either the aspect has been dynamically woven after the cor-
responding call to malloc that returned buffer and this call to free(buffer)
void ∗ checkMalloc(size t size) {
void ∗ buﬀer = malloc(size);
addMalloc = addMalloc ∪ {buﬀer};
addFree = addFree \ {buﬀer};
return buﬀer;
}
void checkFree(void ∗ buﬀer) {
if (buﬀer ∈ addFree) exit(error);
else if (buﬀer /∈ addMalloc) warning();
free(buﬀer);
addFree = addFree ∪ {buﬀer};
addMalloc = addMalloc \ {buﬀer};
}
call(void ∗ malloc(size t)) && args(size) then checkMalloc(size);
call(void free(void∗)) && args(buﬀer) then checkFree(buﬀer);
Fig. 4. An aspect for detecting double-free bugs
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is correct, or the aspect has been dynamically woven after the previous call to
free(buffer) and the current call is a bug. These two cases cannot be distin-
guished, so the advice only prints a warning. The memory is freed, and the two
sets of addresses are maintained. Note that, if the user does not care about warn-
ings, the aspect can be simpliﬁed by suppressing the set addMalloc.
TCP to UDP Protocol. The aspect shown in Fig. 5 translates transport
protocols from TCP to UDP. A protocol deﬁnes a sequence of function calls, so
the top-level operator of this aspect is seq. The sequence aspect syntactically
consists of a list of pairs of pointcut and advice, with the pairs being separated
by “;”. In the example, the TCP protocol starts with a call to socket() with
three arguments that are bound to family, type and protocol and compared to
constants (AF INET, SOCK STREAM and 0) in the if-expression. When such
a call is matched for which the comparisons in the if-expression also evaluates
to true, the second parameter is replaced by SOCK DGRAM as required by the
UDP protocol. The result of this transformed call, the ﬁle descriptor, is bound
to fd by return(fd). Then the next call to connect() is matched for which the
same ﬁle descriptor has to be the ﬁrst parameter (achieved by binding it to fd1
and comparing it to fd in an if-expression). In this case, the values of the other
parameters are bound to arguments address and length, and the original call is
replaced by returnZero(), which simulates a successful connection establishment
by returning zero and doing nothing else. Indeed, there is no connect step in
the UDP protocol. After that, calls to read() and write() (using the “or” on
aspects: ||) on the same ﬁle descriptor fd are translated to UDP recvfrom()
and sendto(), respectively. Note that sequences of such access are potentially
repeatedly translated (due to use of the repetition operator “∗”). Finally, a call
to close() on the same ﬁle descriptor fd terminates the TCP protocol as well as
seq( call(int socket(int, int, int)) && args(family, type,protocol)
&& if((family == AF INET) && (type == SOCK STREAM)
&& (protocol == 0))
&& return(fd)
then socket(AF INET,SOCK DGRAM, 0);
call(int connect(int, struct socketaddr∗, socklen t))
&& args(fd1, address, length) && if(fd1 == fd)
then returnZero(); // where int returnZero() { return 0; }
( call(size t read(int, void∗, size t)) && args(fd2, readBuﬀer, readLength)
&& if(fd2 == fd)
then recvfrom(fd, readBuﬀer, readLength, 0, address, length);
|| call(size t write(int, void∗, size t))
&& args(fd3,writeBuﬀer,writeLength) && if(fd3 == fd)
then sendto(fd,writeBuﬀer,writeLength, 0, address, length); ) ∗
call(int close(int)) && args(fd4) && if(fd4 == fd) ; )
Fig. 5. An aspect for switching transport protocols, from TCP to UDP
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seq( call(void ∗ malloc(size t))
&& args(allocatedSize) && return(buﬀer) ;
write(buﬀer) && size(writtenSize)
&& if(writtenSize > allocatedSize)
then reportOverflow (); ∗
call(void free(void∗)) && args(b1) && if(b1 == buﬀer) ; )
Fig. 6. An aspect for detecting buﬀer overﬂow
require Number Of Fd as int∗;
require Squid MaxFd as int∗;
controlflow(call(void clientSendMoreData(void∗, char∗, size t)),
call(HttpReply ∗ clientBuildReply(clientHttpRequest∗, char∗, size t))
&& args( request,buﬀer,buﬀerSize ))
then startPrefetching(request, buﬀer,buﬀerSize);
&& until(writeGlobal(int ∗ Number Of Fd) && if((∗Number Of Fd) ∗
100/(∗Squid MaxFd) ≥ 75) ; )
controlflow( call(void clientSendMoreData(void∗, char∗, size t)),
call(void comm write mbuf(int,MemBuf, void∗, void∗))
&& args(fd,mb,handler,handlerData) && if(! isPrefetch(handler)) )
then parseHyperlinks(fd,mb,handler,handlerData);
call(void clientWriteComplete(int, char∗, size t, int, void∗))
&& args(fd,buf, size, error, data) && if(! isPrefetch(handler))
then retrieveHyperlinks(fd,buf, size, error, data);
Fig. 7. An aspect for prefetching
the UDP protocol and thus is not modiﬁed (i.e., there is no then clause). This
last step is required to free the variables used in the sequence (here, fd, address
and length). Indeed, this aspect can use numerous (instances of these) variables
when it deals with interleaved sequences, as each call to socket() creates a new
instance of the sequence.
Buﬀer Overﬂows. The aspect shown in Fig. 6 detects buﬀer overﬂows. The
corresponding sequence starts when the function malloc() returns the buﬀer
address that is then bound to the buﬀer. Then, each time this address is accessed
(through a global variable or a local alias) the size of the data to be written is
compared with the size of the initially allocated memory. If the former exceeds
the latter, an overﬂow is indicated. The sequence ends when the memory is
deallocated using free().
From Fetching to Prefetching. The aspect in Fig. 7 introduces prefetching
in a Web cache. The ﬁrst controlflow phrase initializes prefetching when an
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HTTP response is built (clientBuildReply()) within the control ﬂow of a client
request (clientSendMoreData()). The until clause stops prefetching when the
number of connection becomes too large, a situation where prefetching would
eﬀectively degrade performance. The second controlflow phrase analyzes hy-
perlinks in a page being transmitted (i.e., when comm write mbuf() is called
within the control ﬂow of clientSendMoreData()). Finally, the last call phrase
prefetches hyperlinks analyzed by the second aspect. It does so by replacing the
method call to clientWriteComplete() with retrieveHyperlinks(). Finally, note
that the two require clauses at the top of the aspect declare the types of the
global variables of the base program used in the aspects.
3.2 Joinpoints
A joinpoint model deﬁnes the points in the execution of the base program to
which pointcuts may refer. In our case, joinpoints are deﬁned by JP in the
grammar shown in Fig. 8. A joinpoint is either:
– A call of a function callJP(v1 funId(−→v2)) with function name funId , return
value v1 and a vector of arguments −→v2 .
– A read access that comes in two variants: readGlobalJP(varId, v) denotes
reading a global variable with name varId holding the value v ; readJP(@, v)
denotes reading a global variable or a local alias with address @ holding the
value v .
– Write access, which also comes in two variants: writeGlobalJP(varId, v, size)
denotes assignment to a global variable with name varId of the value v of
size size. writeJP(@, v, size) denotes assignment to a global variable or a
local alias with address @ of the value v of size size.
– A cﬂow expression controlflowJP(
−−−−→
funId, c), where
−−−−→
funId = [funId1 , ..,
funIdn ] is a stack of function names, and c (either a function call or an
JP ::= callJP(val funId(
−→
val))
| readGlobalJP(varId, val)
| readJP(@, val)
| writeGlobalJP(varId, val, size)
| writeJP(@, val, size)
| controlflowJP(−−−−→funId, cfEnd)
| controlflowstarJP(−−−−→funId, cfEnd)
cfEnd ::= callJP(val funId(
−→
val))
| readGlobalJP(varId, val)
| writeGlobalJP(varId, val, size)
val ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | ... // int
| @0 | @1 | @2 | ... // int*
| ... // values of other C types
Fig. 8. Joinpoint model
186 R. Douence et al.
access to a global variable) occurs within the body of function funIdn. Such
a joinpoint requires a call to funIdi+1 within the body of funIdi.
– A cﬂow expression controlflowstarJP(
−−−−→
funId, c), where
−−−−→
funId = [funId1 ,
.., funIdn ] is a partial stack of function names, and c (either a function call
or an access to a global variable) occurs within the control flow of function
funIdn. Such a joinpoint requires a call to funIdi+1 within the control ﬂow
of (i.e., not necessarily in the body of) funIdi. Therefore, in contrast to the
preceding cﬂow expression, no direct nesting is required, but the functions
and the ﬁnal execution point c may be nested at arbitrary depth within the
preceding function.
Two features of this joinpoint model may be surprising at ﬁrst sight: distinc-
tion of accesses to aliases from those to global variables and explicit representa-
tion of control ﬂow expressions. Both are motivated by our quest for eﬃciency
and are grounded in strong implementation constraints in the context of dy-
namic weaving of binary C code: An access to a local alias is several magnitudes
slower than that to a global variable, and matching of control ﬂow joinpoints
can be done using an atomic test on the implementation level.
3.3 Pointcuts
We now present a pointcut language (Fig. 9) that provides constructs to match
individual joinpoints.
Primitive pointcuts are deﬁned by PPrim and comprise three basic pointcuts:
matching calls, global variable accesses and control ﬂow joinpoints. Primitive
pointcuts can also be combined using a logical “or”, noted ||.
A call pointcut PCall selects all call joinpoints callJP(val funId(
−→
val)), i.e.,
all calls to a function matching the signature type funId(
−−→
type), where the argu-
ments of the function can be bound to pointcut variables using argument binder
args(
−−−−−→
pattern ) and the return value can be bound to a pointcut variable us-
ing a return clause return( pattern ). The two constructs args(
−−−−−→
pattern ) and
return( pattern ) can also provide pattern matching by using values (or already
bound pointcut variables) in pattern. Pointcuts can also depend on a Boolean
condition using the if-constructor.
A global access pointcut PAccGlobal selects either all read joinpoints, i.e.,
readGlobalJP(varId, val), or all write joinpoints writeGlobalJP(varId, val, size)
on the global base program variable varId . In these cases, the read or written
value can be bound to a variable using value(pattern). In addition, the size of
the written value can be bound with size(varName). Pattern matching can also
be used for variable access.
A control ﬂow pointcut PCf , which is of the form controlflow( PCallSig1 ,
..., PCallSign , PCfEnd), matches controlflowJP(funId1, ..., funIdn, cfEnd)
joinpoints, where the function identiﬁer in PCallSigi is funIdi. Similarly, a
control ﬂow pointcut may match a global variable access for a given stack con-
ﬁguration. The pointcuts of the form controlflowstar(. . . ) select calls or global
variable accesses in a stack context, allowing for calls that are not directly nested
within one another.
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PPrim ::= PCall
| PAccGlobal
| PCf
| PPrim || PPrim
PCall ::= PCallSig [ && args(
−−−−−→
pattern ) ] [ && return( pattern ) ]
[ && PIf ]
PCallSig ::= call( type funId(
−−→
type) )
PIf ::= if( expr ) [ && PIf ]
PAccGlobal ::= readGlobal( type varId ) [ && value( pattern ) ] [ && PIf ]
| writeGlobal( type varId ) [ && value( pattern ) ]
[ && size( pattern ) ] [ && PIf ]
PCf ::= controlflow( PCallSigList, PCfEnd )
| controlflowstar( PCallSigList, PCfEnd )
PCallSigList ::= PCallSig [ , PCallSigList ]
PCfEnd ::= PCall | PAccGlobal
PAcc ::= read( var ) [ && PIf ]
| write( var ) [ && size( pattern ) ] [ && PIf ]
pattern ::= var | val
Fig. 9. Pointcut language
Finally, PAcc, an access pointcut for a global variable or all of its local aliases,
matches all joinpoints of the form readJP or writeJP.
3.4 Aspect Language
The aspect language we propose is deﬁned in Fig. 10. Aspects Asp are either
primitive aspects AspPrim, or sequences of primitive aspects AspSeq.
Both primitive and sequence aspects can be combined with requirement
statements. A requirement statement is needed for each function or global vari-
able of the base program used in the aspect. Similar to the declaration of a
function before its ﬁrst use in a C ﬁle, e.g., in a header ﬁle, a function or
global variable with identiﬁer Id has to be speciﬁed in a requirement state-
ment require Id as Type; before it can be used in an aspect.
A primitive aspect AspPrim combines a primitive pointcut with an advice
that will be applied to all joinpoints selected by the pointcut. An advice (Advice)
is a C function call that replaces a joinpoint in the base program execution
(similarly to around in AspectJ). It must have the same return type as the
joinpoint it replaces, that is, the type of the global variable in case of a read
access, void for a write access and the return type of the function for a call.
When the advice is empty (no then clause), the original joinpoint is executed.
The original joinpoint can be skipped by calling an empty C function.
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Asp ::= RequireStmt Asp
| AspPrim [ && until( AspPrim ) ]
| AspeSeq [ && until( AspPrim ) ]
RequireStmt ::= require Id as Type ;
AspPrim ::= PPrim Advice
AspSeq ::= seq( AspPrim
AspSeqElts
AspSeqElt )
AspSeqElts ::= AspSeqElt [AspSeqElts]
| AspSeqElt ∗ [AspSeqElts]
AspSeqElt ::= AspPrim
| PAcc Advice
| (AspSeqElt || AspSeqElt)
Advice ::= ;
| then funId(−−−−−→pattern) ;
pattern ::= var
| value
Fig. 10. Aspect language
A sequence aspect is composed of a sequence of primitive aspects. A sequence
instance is created when the pointcut of the ﬁrst primitive aspect matches. The
following primitive aspects in the sequence are activated as soon as the corre-
sponding pointcut matches (i.e., a primitive aspect has priority over its prede-
cessor if both match). All but the ﬁrst and last primitive aspects can be repeated
zero or multiple times by using the operator “∗”. Branching, i.e., a logical “or”
between two primitive aspects in a sequence, is supported by the operator ||.
Diﬀerent sequence instances are (conceptually) matched in parallel.
A primitive or a sequence aspect a can be used in combination with an
expression until(a1 ), to restrict its scope. In this case, once a joinpoint has
been matched by a, the execution of a proceeds as previously described until a1
matches.
To conclude the presentation of our language, note that it does not include
some features, such as named pointcuts as arguments to controlflows, and con-
junctive terms, which are not necessary for the examples we considered but which
could easily be added. (As an aside, note that such extensions of the pointcut
language may aﬀect the computability of advanced algorithmic problems, such
as whether a pointcut matches some part of any base program [36].)
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4 Formal Semantics for Expressive Aspects
In the previous sections, we have given an informal semantics of our aspect
language. We now illustrate how the aspect language can be formally deﬁned by
means of two diﬀerent semantics:
– A semantics translating our aspects language into an extension of the lan-
guage used in the formal framework of [37]. This semantics abstracts from
most implementation details but allows a clear and succinct deﬁnition of the
main properties of our sequence construct.
– A semantics providing a translation scheme into the actual C implementation
used in the Arachne tool. This semantics has been harnessed to establish
correctness arguments about and and thus guide the implementation of our
tool.
4.1 An Abstract Formal Semantics
Douence et al. [37, 38] have introduced a generic framework for AOP support-
ing stateful crosscuts, i.e., pointcuts with explicit state. Without relying on any
speciﬁc programming language, they have applied this framework to the formal
deﬁnition of aspects and for certain kinds of reasoning techniques over aspects.
In the case of our aspect language, their language must be extended in order to
deal with halting aspects, an unbounded number of sequential aspects executed
in parallel and arbitrary joinpoint predicates. The grammar of our extended
version, our tiny aspect language, is deﬁned in Fig. 11. In this language, as-
pect expressions A consist of parallel combinations of aspects. C is a joinpoint
predicate (similar to our pointcut language) expressed as a conjunction of a
term pattern and possibly an expression from the constraint logic programming
language CLP(R) [39].
An aspect A′ is either:
– A parallel composition of two aspects A1 || A2.
– A recursive deﬁnition.
– A sequence formed using the preﬁx operation C  I ; X , where X is an
aspect, a recursion variable, or a halting aspect STOP, and I a piece of code
(i.e., an advice).
A ::= A′
| A || A ; parallelism
A′ ::= µa.A′ ; recursive definition (a ∈ Rec)
| C  I; A ; prefixing
| C  I; a ; end of sequence (a ∈ Rec)
| C  I; STOP ; halting aspect
| A′  A′ ; choice
Fig. 11. Tiny aspect language
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– A choice construction A1  A2 (A1, A2 must not be parallel expressions)
which chooses the ﬁrst aspect that matches a joinpoint (the other is thrown
away). If both match the same joinpoint, A1 is chosen.
One can think of a stateful aspect A (as well as A′) as a kind of transition
system. Thereby, an aspect is always in a certain state in its execution, e.g., at
rule C  I (which is the head of a sequence of rules, which in turn is possibly
part of a more complex expression), and waiting on a joinpoint to match C. If
a joinpoint matching C occurs, the aspect executes I and advances to the next
state, i.e., the next rule in the sequence.
Protocol Translation. The semantics of the protocol translation aspect (from
TCP to UDP) is given in Fig. 12. A sequence can have several instances. This
is translated into the language A by the expression a1 || ..., which starts
a new sequence a1 once the ﬁrst joinpoint has been matched and continues
to match the rest of the sequence in progress. The repetition operator “∗” is
translated into recursion on the variable a2. The branching operator || of the
source language is translated into the choice operator  of A. Finally, the last
primitive aspect of the sequence occurs as the ﬁrst aspect of a choice to get
priority over the joinpoints read and write because of the repetition marked by
“∗”. Note that we use joinpoint patterns with variables, where an overbar marks
the ﬁrst occurrence of a variable (i.e., its deﬁnition in opposition to a use) and
subsequent variable occurrences without overbar mark variable uses (e.g., to use
the value of the ﬁle descriptor fd in argument positions).
Buﬀer Overﬂow Detection. The semantics of the aspect for detecting buﬀer-
overﬂows is given in Fig. 13. This deﬁnition reports overﬂows after memory for
a buﬀer has been allocated until a joinpoint matches the free crosscut, in which
case the sequence instance corresponding to the freed buﬀer will be stopped.
These examples demonstrate that this style of semantics clearly exhibits the
advantages stated in the beginning by concisely deﬁning three important prop-
erties of our sequence aspect:
1. A sequence can have several instances, as for each joinpoint matching the
pointcut of the ﬁrst primitive aspect, a new sequence instance is created.
The parallel operator a1 || ... in the translation of the sequence aspect
µa1. callJP(fd socket(AF INET,SOCK STREAM, 0)) 
socket(AF INET, SOCK DGRAM, 0);
a1 || ( callJP(var1 connect(fd, address, length))  returnZero();
µa2. callJP(var2 close(fd))  close(fd); STOP
 callJP(var3 read(fd, readBuﬀer, readLength)) 
recvfrom(fd, readBuffer, readLength, 0, address, length); a2
 callJP(var4 write(fd,writeBuﬀer,writeLength)) 
recvfrom(fd,writeBuffer, writeLength, 0, address, length); a2
Fig. 12. Deﬁnition of the protocol translation using the tiny aspect language
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µa1. callJP(buﬀer malloc(allocatedSize))  malloc(allocatedSize);
a1 || µa2. callJP(var1 free(buﬀer))  free(buﬀer); STOP
 writeJP(buﬀer, var2,writtenSize)
&& (writtenSize > allocatedSize)  reportOverflow() ; a2
Fig. 13. Deﬁnition of the buﬀer overﬂow aspect using the tiny aspect language
expresses this property. Once the ﬁrst joinpoint has been matched, a new
sequence a1 is started and the rest of the sequence in progress continues to
match in parallel.
2. The last step in a sequence aspect determines the ﬁnalization of sequence
instances. When a joinpoint matches the pointcut of the last sequence el-
ement and a sequence instance is in a state waiting for such a joinpoint,
i.e., the instance has already passed all previous steps of the sequence, the
advice of the last step is executed and then the instance is terminated. In A′,
the ﬁnalization is expressed by STOP, which terminates the corresponding
sequence.
3. The star operator ∗ attached to a sequence step, besides expressing rep-
etition, causes the following step to have priority over its predecessor. The
choice operator  and the order of arguments of the choice in the translation
ensure this property.
Note that formal deﬁnitions such as that of the protocol translation aspect
and the buﬀer overﬂow detection aspect precisely deﬁne several important issues,
which are somewhat implicit in the sequence aspect construct. In particular, they
deﬁne when new instances of the sequence aspect are created: A new sequence
instance is created once the ﬁrst step in the sequence is matched, i.e., sequences
are implicitly in scope of a repetition. The abstract semantics could be used, e.g.,
to formally prove that two instances match when a joinpoint matches the ﬁrst as
well as another step of a sequence. Furthermore, they disambiguate potentially
nondeterministic situations, e.g., when two pointcuts of consecutive primitive
aspects in the sequence match at the same time. Finally, this style of semantics
clearly abstracts from implementation details, e.g., how the sequence state is
represented in the implementation.
4.2 An Implementation-Level Semantics
Due to its abstractness, the semantics presented in the previous section illus-
trates certain properties of Arachne’s aspect language very clearly, e.g., when
new sequence instances are created. However, it abstracts from many details
that are relevant, in particular, to judge the correctness of the Arachne tool:
most important the above semantics abstracts from the generated C code, the
C run-time environment and the concrete weaving process. In order to support
a detailed understanding of the Arachne tool we have therefore developed an
implementation-level formal semantics, which we present in this section.
This implementation-level semantics — in the remainder of this section the
term “semantics” always refers to the implementation-level semantics — is
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formulated as a denotational semantics [40] whose valuation functions deﬁne
transformations from aspects into the corresponding C code executed by the
Arachne tool. Technically, the valuation functions map syntactic categories of
our language to a list of code generation functions. The code generation functions
deﬁne code that handles the initialization of aspects, the dynamic conditions that
are used to check whether a joinpoint actually matches the pointcut of an aspect
as well as calls to the advice.
In addition, the generated code contains symbolic references to rewriting sites,
i.e., places in the base program that have to be rewritten. The exact sites to be
rewritten are ﬁrst known at run time, as only then the aspect is woven into
the base program. After the aspect code is generated, it will be compiled into a
dynamic link library (DLL).3 At weave time, the aspect DLL will then instruct
Arachne to instrument the base program at the appropriate places and once
such a site is encountered at run time, the dynamic predicates are tested and
the advice function eventually executed.
This semantics therefore helps understanding of the Arachne tool by the fol-
lowing two characteristics:
– code generation functions providing a structured presentation of the executed
C code
– a notion of rewriting sites providing an explicit representation of the weaving
process
This way it is concrete enough to serve for correctness considerations of our
tool, while being abstract enough to enable such considerations compositionally
in terms of structural entities.
In this section we ﬁrst present the denotational semantics in the context of
a concrete example aspect and the evaluation of that aspect by means of the
semantics. Second, we present a detailed overview of the semantics (a complete
account can be found in [41]).
Example: Semantics of a Control Flow-Based Aspect. In order to il-
lustrate the semantics and provide some information about the complexity in
using the semantics (which cannot be completely avoided since it enables, in
ﬁne, derivation of the executed C code), we ﬁrst discuss a concrete transforma-
tion. The following example shows an aspect that executes an advice action(x)
when the function h is called within a control ﬂow path on which functions f
and g have already been called (see Listing 1 for the aspect deﬁnition).
Figure 14 presents three steps resulting from the application of the valuation
functions of the semantics to the preceding aspect deﬁnition:
(a) The initial transformation step introduces initialization code and calls the
valuation function corresponding to the aspect at hand (here AP).
3 A library that is linked to a process/application at run time rather than at compile
time and can be shared between several processes (called “shared object libraries”
under Unix).
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Acontrolflow(call(int f(int)),call(long g(short)),
call(float h(double))&&args(x))
then action(x);
= (step a)
createAspectInitialization(1);
createAspectCompletionGuard();
APcontrolflow(call(int f(int)),call(long g(short)),
call(float h(double))&&args(x))
then action(x);(1)
. . .
= (step b)
createAspectInitialization(1);
createAspectCompletionGuard();
defineAF ACTION(1,1, action(x) );
defineMacro(NUMBER OF JPS,1,1);
defineJPMacro(1,1);
let (c,d) = PCSLcall(int f(int)),call(long g(short))("",0)
in defineCF BEGIN(1,0,c,d);
defineCF END FC(1,0);
PCcall(float h(double))&&args(x))(1,0)
createPrimitiveAspect(1);
. . .
= (step c)
createAspectInitialization(1);
createAspectCompletionGuard();
defineAF ACTION(1,1, action(x) );
defineMacro(NUMBER OF JPS,1,1);
defineJPMacro(1,1);
defineCF BEGIN(1,0,""f","g"",2);
defineCF END FC(1,0);
defineORIGINAL FC(1,"float","h","double","x");
createEntryPointFunctionFC(1,0,"float","h","double","x",
"double x");
createJoinPointFunCall(1,0,"h");
createPrimitiveAspect(1);
Fig. 14. Example: Transformation of an control ﬂow-based aspect (excerpt)
controlflow (call(int f(int)),call(long g(short)),
call(float h(double)) && args(x)) then action(x);
Li i A lﬂ
Listing 1. Aspect using a control ﬂow pointcut
194 R. Douence et al.
(b) An intermediate step which enables matching of the call to h (via the point-
cut valuation function PC) after the call sequence f;g has been matched
(valuation function PCSL)).
(c) The ﬁnal step represents the complete aspect code. This deﬁnition is given
in terms of functions manipulating macro deﬁnitions (which, in turn, corre-
spond to “real” C macros). The use of macro manipulation functions allows
the semantics to be expressed quite concisely while still completely deﬁning
the executing code. The ﬁnal step makes explicit, e.g., that pointcut match-
ing is specialized w.r.t. the concrete number of joinpoints (through the use
of NUMBER OF JPS), which governs how many concrete joinpoint macros can
be instantiated (via defineJPMacro).
Listing 2 shows the executed code, i.e., once all the macro deﬁnitions and
manipulations resulting from the ﬁnal step of the transformation shown in Fig. 14
have been resolved.
This code (which is actually executed code, not some pseudocode) that will
be generated by the compiler consists of initialization code, the advice and en-
trypoint of the aspect, a ﬁle guard and an aspect structure.
When the compiled aspect DLL is loaded, the initialization code (lines 1–4)
triggers the automatic initialization of the aspect. Thereby the aspect is added
to the active aspects and Arachne’s kernel instruments all sites in the base pro-
gram aﬀected by the aspect structure (lines 32–54), which in the example are
all function calls to h. Once the base: program executes a site rewritten for the
aspect, the guard (lines 6–10) of the aspect, which indicates the progress of the
weaving process, is checked to see whether it is true or false. In case all aﬀected
sites have been rewritten, the guard is set to true and the corresponding entry-
point function (lines 12–30) is invoked. In the entrypoint function the dynamic
part of the pointcut is checked, to see whether the joinpoint really matches. In
our example, the stack is checked for the functions f and g that are speciﬁed
in the controlflow pointcut. If the dynamic predicate of the pointcut holds
for the joinpoint, the advice/action (line 24) is executed; otherwise the original
function is executed (lines 27–28).
The aspect structure (lines 32–54) consists of an array of joinpoints aﬀected by
the aspect (lines 35–48). Each joinpoint in the array speciﬁes an entrypoint func-
tion (line 42), has a type and, in case of a function call or a global read
or write access, additionally speciﬁes a function identiﬁer or a variable identi-
ﬁer, respectively. In the example, the only joinpoint of the array is a function call
joinpoint, and thus the function identiﬁer is speciﬁed (line 43). The AllocatorAPI
provides an interface for the dynamic allocation and deallocation of structures,
and each structure required for an aspect thus has a pointer to it (lines 8, 15, 34,
37, 41).
Overview of the Implementation-Level Semantics. Figure 15 shows a typ-
ical excerpt of the semantics itself. Valuation functions typically map syntactic
entities to lists of code generation functions (see the signature of the valuation
function A). They may, however, also depend on context information, e.g., the
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static Aspect * __aspect_1__; static void initAspect_1 ()
2 __attribute__ (( constructor )); static void initAspect_1 () {
AspectsInFile ->api ->add(AspectsInFile ,__aspect_1__)
4 }
6 static Guard * __fileGuard__ = & (Guard) {
(GuardAPI *) & __guardAPI__ ,
8 (AllocatorAPI *) & __transparentAllocatorAPI__ ,
false
10 };
12 float entryPointOfJoinPoint_1_0(double x) {
static CFlow * cflow = & (CFlow) {
14 (CFlowAPI *) & __CFLowAPI__ ,
(AllocatorAPI *) & __transparentAllocatorAPI__ ,
16 (char* []) {"f","g"},
UNKNOWN_EIP_2_FUNCTION_ADDRESS
18 };
static boolean init = false;
20 if(!init) {
defaultLoader ->api ->loadJoinpoint(defaultLoader ,cflow);
22 }
if(CHECK_STACK(cflow ->functions ,cflowFunctions ,2,1,1)){
24 return action(x);
}
26 else{
return (( float (*) (double ))
28 (defaultAspectLoader ->api ->getSymbolsByName("h")))(x);
}
30 }
32 static Aspect* __aspect_1__ = & (Aspect) {
(AspectAPI *) & __AspectAPI__ ,
34 (AllocatorAPI *) & __transparentAllocatorAPI__ ,
& (ArrayOfJoinpoint) {
36 (ArrayOfJoinpointAPI *) & __ArrayOfJoinpointAPI__ ,
(AllocatorAPI *) & __transparentAllocatorAPI__ ,
38 (Joinpoint *) {
Joinpoint) &(void *[]) {
40 (JoinpointAPI *) &__FunctionCallJoinpointAPI__ ,
(AllocatorAPI *) &__transparentAllocatorAPI__ ,
42 (void*) entryPointOfJoinPoint_1_0 ,
"h"
44 };
},
46 1,
1
48 },
UNKNOWN_SOURCE ,
50 UNKNOWN_PATH ,
UNKNOWN_LINE ,
52 TO_STRING("handgenerated"),
__fileGuard__
54 }
Listing 2. Example: Generated code for a control ﬂow aspect (Listing 1)
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A: Aspect −→ CG∗
AAspSeq =
createAspectInitialization(1);
createAspectCompletionGuard();
ASAspSeq(1)
PCF: ControlFlowPointcut −→( INT × INT ) −→CG∗
PCFcontrolflow(PCallSigList,PCall)(n,m) =
let (l,d) = PCSLPCallSigList("",0)
in defineCF BEGIN(n,m,l,d);
defineCF END FC(n,m);
PCPCall(n,m)
PCSL: FunctionCallSignature* −→(STRING × INT ) −→(STRING × INT )
PCSLcall(Type FunId(TypeList))(s,i) =
(concat(s,concat("\"",concat(SFunId ,"\""))),i+1)
PCSLcall(Type FunId(TypeList)),PCallSigList(s,i) =
PCSLPCallSigList(concat(concat(s,","),
concat("\"",concat(SFunId ,"\""))),i+1)
Fig. 15. Valuation function of implementation-level semantics (excerpt)
function identiﬁers (e.g., the string arguments in the signature of function PCF)
and position arguments in a sequence of a list of code generation functions (see
the signatures of functions PCF and PCSL). The valuation function A deﬁnes
how aspects are transformed by introducing aspect intialization code and then
calling the valuation function of the current aspect construct (sequences, in the
excerpt). The valuation function PCF deﬁnes that control-ﬂow pointcuts are
translated by ﬁrst generating test code (by means of PCSL) for the sequence
of calls in whose ﬂow the ﬁnal call has to occur, setting the macros CF BEGIN,
CF END FC which allow to test such a context and, ﬁnally, generating test code
for the ﬁnal call (using PC).
5 Dynamic Weaving with Arachne
Arachne is built around two tools (Fig. 16), an aspect compiler and a run-
time weaver. The aspect compiler translates the aspect source code into a com-
piled library that, at weaving time, directs the weaver to place the hooks in the
base program. The hooking mechanisms used in Arachne are based on improved
techniques originally developed for µDyner [4]. These techniques allow users to
rewrite the binary code of executable ﬁles on the ﬂy, i.e., without pausing the
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Fig. 16. Arachne’s architecture
base program, as long as these ﬁles conform to the mapping deﬁned by the Unix
standard [42] between the C language and x86 assembly language. Arachne’s
implementation is structured as an open framework that allows one to experi-
ment with new kinds of joinpoints and pointcut constructs. Another important
diﬀerence between Arachne and µDyner is that µDyner requires a compile time
preparation of the base program, whereas Arachne does not. Hence Arachne is
totally transparent for the base program while µDyner is not.
5.1 The Arachne Open Architecture
The Arachne open architecture is structured around three main entities: the
aspect compiler, the instrumentation kernel and the diﬀerent rewriting strategies.
The aspect compiler translates the aspect source code into C before compiling
it. Weaving is accomplished through a command line tool weave that acts as a
front end for the instrumentation kernel. weave relays weaving requests to the
instrumentation kernel loaded in the address space of the program through Unix
sockets. Upon reception of a weaving request, the instrumentation kernel selects
the appropriate rewriting strategies referred by the aspects to be woven and
instruments the base program accordingly. The rewriting strategy consults the
pointcut analysis performed by the aspect compiler to locate the places where
the binary code of the base program needs to be rewritten. It ﬁnally modiﬁes
the binary code to actually tie the aspects to the base program.
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With this approach, the Arachne core is independent of a particular aspect,
of the aspect language, of the particular processor architecture and of a partic-
ular base program. In fact, all dependencies to aspect language implementation
are limited to the aspect compiler. All dependencies to the operating system
are localized in the instrumentation kernel and, ﬁnally, all dependencies to the
underlying hardware architecture are modularized in the rewriting strategies.
The Arachne Aspect Compilation Process. The aspect compilation scheme
is relatively straightforward: It transforms advices into regular C functions.
Pointcuts are rewritten as C code driving hook insertions into the base pro-
gram at weaving time. There are, however, cases where the sole introduction of
hooks is insuﬃcient to determine whether an advice should be executed. In this
case, the aspect compiler generates functions that complement the hooks with
dynamic tests on the state of the base program. These dynamic tests are called
residues in AspectJ, and the rewritten instructions within the base program the
shadow [43]. Once the aspects have been translated into C, the Arachne compiler
uses a legacy C compiler to generate a dynamically linked library (DLL) for the
compiled aspects.
The Arachne Weaving Process. From a user viewpoint, the Arachne weave
and deweave command line programs the same syntax as µDyner’s version.
They both take two arguments. The ﬁrst identiﬁes the process to weave aspects
in or deweave aspects from, and the second indicates the aspect DLL. However,
Arachne can target potentially any C application running on the machine, while
µDyner was limited to applications compiled with it running on the machine.
When Arachne’s weave receives a request to weave an aspect in a process that
does not contain the Arachne instrumentation kernel, it loads the kernel in the
process address space using standard techniques [44].
The instrumentation kernel is transparent for the base program, since the
latter cannot access the resources (memory and sockets essentially) used by the
former. Once injected, the kernel creates a thread with the Linux system call:
clone. This thread handles the diﬀerent weaving requests. Compared to the
POSIX pthread create function, the usage of clone allows the instrumentation
thread to prevent the base program to access its sockets. The instrumentation
kernel allocates memory by using side-eﬀect-free allocation routines (through the
Linux mmap API). Because the allocation routines are side-eﬀect-free, Arachne’s
memory is totally invisible to the base program. It is up to the aspect to use
Arachne’s memory allocation routines or base program-speciﬁc allocation func-
tions. This transparency turns out to be crucial in our experiments. Legacy
applications such as Squid use dedicated resource management routines and ex-
pect any piece of code they run to use these routines. Failures will result in an
application crash.
After loading an aspect, the instrumentation kernel rewrites the binary code
of the base program. These rewriting strategies are not included in the kernel
and must be fetched on demand by each loaded aspect.
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5.2 Rewriting Strategies
Rewriting strategies are responsible for transforming the binary code of the base
program to eﬀectively tie aspects to the base program at weaving time. These
strategies localize Arachne’s main dependencies to the underlying hardware ar-
chitecture. In general, rewriting strategies need to collect information about the
base program. This information typically consists of the addresses of the dif-
ferent shadows, their sizes, the symbol (i.e., function or global variable name)
they manipulate, their length, etc. In order to keep compiled aspects indepen-
dent from the base program, this information is gathered on demand at run
time. The mapping between a symbol name in the base program source code
and its address in memory is inferred from linking information contained in the
base program executable. However, because this information can be costly to
retrieve, Arachne collects and stores it into metainformation DLLs. These DLLs
behave as a kind of cache and lessen the problem of collecting the information
required to instrument the base program. To implement our aspect language,
Arachne provides a set of eight rewriting strategies that might eventually use
each other.
Strategies for call, readGlobal and writeGlobal. In Arachne, call,
readGlobal and writeGlobal allow an advice to be triggered upon a function
call, a read on a global variable or a write, respectively. While the implementation
shadow: rewriting
site replaced by a
x86 instruction
x86 instruction
x86 instruction
x86 instruction
execution flow
generated at aspect compile time
Aspect DLLHooks generated at weaving
time
jump
Binary code of the
compiled base
program
and/or advices
Residue (dynamic tests)
Entry hook
save registers
Return hook
Restore registers
instruction(s)
Relocated tailored
updating registers
Legacy base program
Fig. 17. Generic hook operations
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of readGlobal and writeGlobal in Arachne is close to the one in µDyner,
Arachne implements the strategy for call by rewriting function invocations
found in the base program. µDyner instead rewrites the function body of the
callee. On the Intel architecture, function calls beneﬁt from the direct mapping
to the x86 call assembly instruction that is used by almost, if not all, compilers.
Write and read accesses to global variables are translated into instructions using
immediate, hard-coded addresses within the binary code of the base program.
By comparing these addresses with linking information contained in the base
program executable, Arachne can determine where the global variable is being
accessed. Therefore those primitive pointcuts do not involve any dynamic tests.
The sole rewriting of the binary base program code is enough to trigger advice
and residue4 executions at all appropriate points.
The size of the x86 call instruction and the size of an x86 jump (jmp) in-
struction are the same. Since the instruction performing an access to a global
variable involves a hard-coded address, x86 instructions that read or write a
global variable have at least the size of a x86 jmp instruction. Hence at weaving
time, Arachne rewrites them as a jmp instruction to a hook. Hooks are generated
on the ﬂy on freshly allocated memory. As shown in Fig. 17, hooks contain a few
assembly instructions that save and restore the appropriate registers before and
after an advice (or shadow) execution. A generic approach is to have hooks save
the whole set of registers, then execute the appropriate residue and/or advice
code before restoring the whole set of registers. Finally, the instructions found
at the joinpoint shadow are executed to perform the appropriate side eﬀects
on the processor registers. This is accomplished by relocating the instructions
found at the joinpoint shadow. Relocating the instructions makes the rewriting
strategies handling read and write access to global variables independent from
the instruction generated by the compiler to perform the access.5 The limited
number of x86 instructions used to invoke a function allows Arachne’s rewriting
strategy to exploit more eﬃcient, relocation-free hooks.
Strategies for controlflow and controlflowstar. Every time a C function is
called, the Linux runtime creates an activation record on the call stack [42]. Like
µDyner, Arachne’s implementation of the rewriting strategy for controlflow
uses the most deeply nested function call (or global read or write access) in the
control ﬂow pointcut as shadow. This shadow triggers a residue. This residue
uses the activation record’s chaining to check whether the remaining function
calls of the control ﬂow are on the call stack maintained by the Linux run time.
An appropriate usage of hash tables that store the linking information contained
in the base program executables can thereby decrease the cost of determining if
a speciﬁc function is the caller of another to a pointer comparison. Therefore,
the residue for a controlflow with n directly nested functions implies exactly
4 Residues (i.e., dynamic tests on the base program state) are required when these
primitive pointcuts are combined with conditional pointcuts or when pattern match-
ing is involved.
5 About 250 x86 instruction mnemonics can directly manipulate a global variable.
This corresponds to more than 1000 opcodes.
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n pointer comparisons. However, the residue worst-case run time for the indi-
rect control ﬂow operator controlflowstar that allows for not directly nested
functions is proportional to the base program stack depth.
Strategies for read and write. read and write are new joinpoints not in-
cluded in µDyner that have been added to the latest version of Arachne. Their
implementation relays on a page memory protection as allowed by the Linux op-
erating system interface (i.e., mprotect) and the Intel processor speciﬁcations
[46].6 A read or write pointcut triggers a residue to relocate the bound variable
into a memory page that the base program is not allowed to access and adds a
dedicated signal handler. Any attempt made by the base program to access the
bound variable identiﬁed will then trigger the execution of the previously added
signal handler. This handler will then inspect the binary instruction trying to
access the protected page to determine whether it was a read or a write access
before eventually executing the appropriate advice.
Strategies for seq. Like read and write, seq is a new language feature of
Arachne. µDyner oﬀers no equivalent construct. Arachne’s rewriting strategy of
this operator associates a linked list to every stage inside the sequence except the
last one. Each stage in a sequence triggers a residue that updates these linked
lists to reﬂect state transitions of currently matching execution ﬂows. Upon
matching of the ﬁrst pointcut of the ﬁrst primitive aspect in the seq, a node
is allocated and added to the associated linked list. This node contains a struc-
ture holding variables shared among the diﬀerent pointcuts within the sequence.
Once a joinpoint matches a pointcut of an primitive aspect denoting a stage
in the sequence, Arachne consults every node in the linked list associated with
the previous stage and executes the corresponding advice.7 Arachne eventually
updates the node and, in the absence of a ∗, moves it to the list associated with
the currently matched pointcut. If the matching pointcut corresponds to the end
of the sequence, structures are not moved into another list but are freed. Our
aspect compiler includes an optimization where structures are allocated from a
resizable pool, and upon a sequence termination, structures are not freed but
returned to the pool.
5.3 Limitations of Arachne
Aggressive optimizations of the base program might prevent Arachne from seam-
lessly weaving aspects. Two optimizations are not yet supported by Arachne.
First, if the compiler inlines a function in another one within the binary code of
the base program, the Arachne weaver will fail to properly handle pointcuts re-
ferring to that function. Second, control ﬂow pointcuts are based on the chaining
6 Even if this implementation is Linux/x86 speciﬁc, it is applicable to arbitrary archi-
tectures supporting memory paging.
7 In case the previous stage pointcut was used with a star ∗, Arachne examines nodes
from linked list associated with the last two previous stages, and so on, until a
not-starred primitive aspect in the sequence is reached.
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of activation records. On the x86 architecture, in leaf functions, optimizing com-
pilers sometimes do not maintain this chaining to free one register for the rest of
the computation. This, however, has not been a problem during our experiments
as we used the open-source C compiler gcc. Arachne does not require the base
program’s source code in order to weave aspects, however it relies on linking
information embedded within the executable to determine where the program
code must be rewritten. Hence the stripping of symbols from executables as well
as aggressive optimizations that break the interoperability between compilers
and/or debuggers are incompatible with Arachne. In practice, Arachne can be
used on applications compiled like Squid with two of the three gcc optimization
levels.
6 Performance Evaluation
Aspect-oriented solutions will be used if the aspect system’s language is expres-
sive enough and if the aspect system overhead is low enough for the task at
hand. The purpose of this section is to study Arachne’s performance. We ﬁrst
present the speed of each Arachne language construct and compare it to similar
C language constructs. Second, we study the overhead of extending Squid with
a prefetching policy. Third, we measure the overhead induced by protecting the
Washington University’s FTP server wu-ftpd from a buﬀer-overﬂow vulnerabil-
ity. These two case studies show that even if the cost of some Arachne aspect
language constructs might be high compared to C language constructs, this over-
head is largely amortized in real applications.
6.1 Evaluation of the Language Constructs
This performance evaluation focuses on studying the cost of each construct of our
aspect language. To estimate the cost for each construct of our aspect language,
we wrote an aspect using this construct that behaves as an interpreter of the
base program. For example, to study the performance of readGlobal, we wrote
an aspect whose action returns the value of the global variable referred to in
the pointcut, i.e., we wrote aspects behaving like the base program. For each of
these aspects, we compare the time required to perform the operation matching
the pointcut, in case the operation is interpreted by the woven aspect, with the
time required to carry out the operation natively (without the woven aspect).
For example, to study the performance of readGlobal, we ﬁrst evaluate the time
needed to retrieve the global variable value through the code generated by the
C compiler gcc without any aspect woven and compare this value to the time
needed to retrieve the global variable value through the aspect once it has been
woven in the base program. We express our measurements as a ratio between
these two durations to abstract from the experimentation platform.
This approach requires the ability to measure short periods of time. For in-
stance, a global variable value is usually retrieved (readGlobal in our aspect
language) in a single clock tick. Since standard time measurement APIs were
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not precise enough, our benchmarking infrastructure relies on the rdtsc assem-
bly instruction [45]. This instruction returns the number of clock cycles elapsed
since power up. The Pentium 4 processor has the ability to dynamically reorder
the instructions it executes. To ensure the validity of our measurement, we thus
insert mfence instructions in the generated code whose execution speed is being
measured. An mfence forces the preceding instructions to be fully executed be-
fore going on. The pipeline mechanism in the Pentium 4 processor entails that
the speed of a piece of assembly code depends on the preceding instructions. To
avoid such hidden dependencies, we place the operation whose execution time is
being measured in a loop. We use gcc to unroll the loop at compile time, and
we measure the time to execute the complete loop. This measure divided by the
number of loop repetitions yields an estimation of the time required to execute
the operation. The number of times the loop is executed is chosen after the rela-
tive variations of the measures, i.e., we increased the number of repetitions until
ten runs yields an average relative variation not exceeding 5%. To check the cor-
rectness of our experimental protocol, we measured the time needed to execute
a nop assembly instruction, which requires one processor cycle according to the
Intel speciﬁcation. The measures of nop presented a relative variation of 1.6%.
Table 1 summarizes our experimental results. Using the aspect language to
replace a function that returns immediately is only 1.3 times slower than a
direct, aspectless call to that empty function. Since the aspect compiler packages
advices as regular C functions, and because a call pointcut involves no residue,
this good result is not surprising. When an access to a global variable is replaced
by an advice execution, the hooks generated by the rewriting strategy need to
prepare the processor to call the advice function. This increases the time spent
in the hooks. A seq of three invocations of empty functions is only 3.2 times
slower than the direct, aspectless, three successive functions calls. Compared to
the pointcuts used to delimit the diﬀerent stages, the seq overhead is limited to
a few pointer exchanges between the linked lists holding the bound variable. On
Intel x86, global variable accesses beneﬁt from excellent hardware support. In the
absence of aspects, a direct global variable read is usually carried out in a single
unique cycle. To trigger the advice execution, the Arachne runtime has to save
Table 1. Speed of each language construct used to interpret the base program com-
pared to a native execution
Execution times (cycles)
Arachne Native Ratio
call 28±2.3% 21±1.9% 1.3
seq 201±0.5% 63±1.7% 3.2
cflow 228±1.6% 42±1.8% 5.4
readGlobal 2762±4.3% 1±0.2% 2762
read 9729±4.9% 1±0.6% 9729
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Fig. 18. controlflow, seq and readGlobal performances
and restore the processor state to ensure the execution coherency, as advices are
packaged as regular C functions (see also Sect. 5.2). It is therefore not surprising
that a global variable readGlobal appears as being 2762 times slower than a
direct, aspectless global variable read. read performance can be accounted in
the same way: In the absence of aspect, local variables are accessed in a single
unique cycle. The signal mechanism used in the read requires that the operating
system detects the base program attempt to read into a protected memory page
before locating and triggering the signal handler set up by Arachne, as shown
in Sect. 5.2. Such switches to and from kernel space remain slow. Using read to
read a local variable is 9729 times slower than retrieving the local variable value
directly, without aspects.
seq and controlflow can refer to several points in the execution of the base
program (i.e., diﬀerent stages for seq and diﬀerent function invocations for the
controlflow). The run time of these pointcuts grows linearly with the number
of execution points they refer to and with the number of matching instances.
Variable access pointcut performance varies depending on the size of the data
accessed. Indeed, on IA32 architectures, an access to a variable smaller or equal
to 32 bits is performed atomically in one processor cycle, while time to access
a variable larger than 32 bits grows linearly with the variable size. Hence, the
overhead of an aspect replacing an access to an up to 32-bit variable is constant
and beyond amortized corresponding to the variable size. Figure 18 summarizes
a few experimental results for controlflow, seq and readGlobal that provide
evidence for these performance propositions.
6.2 Case Study on a Real Application
Since executing a base program with aspects can slow it down by a factor rang-
ing between 1.3 and 9729, depending on the aspect construct used, we studied
Arachne’s performance on a real-world application, the Web cache Squid. We
extended Squid with a prefetching policy [46]. As described in Sect. 3.1, we im-
plemented this policy as a set of aspects and made a second implementation
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of this policy by editing the Squid source code and recompiling it. This section
compares the performance of these two implementations using standard Web
cache performance indicators: throughput, response time and hit ratio.
A tool which seemingly is appropriate for such a real-world experience is the
traces generated during Web cache executions. However, obtaining access traces
adequate to study a Web cache performance is diﬃcult. The trace must be long
enough to ﬁll the cache. Because of privacy issues, traces are usually not publicly
available. Since traces do not include the content of the accessed pages, these
pages must be downloaded again. In the meantime, the page contents may have
changed and even the URLs may have disappeared.
Instead of traces, we based our evaluation on Web Polygraph [47]. Polygraph
is a benchmarking tool developed by the Squid team that features a realistic
HTTP and SSL traﬃc generator and a ﬂexible content simulator.
We ﬁlled up the cache and simulated a one-day workload with its two request
rate peaks observed in real-life environments [47]. Table 2 shows some results
of our simulation. Measures have been made during the two request peaks. All
measures, be it the hit time, the miss time, the time needed to deliver a doc-
ument presenting the cache or not, are very similar, independent of Arachne
being used or not. These measures prove that diﬀerences are imperceptible be-
tween the version of Squid extended by Arachne and the one extended manually
(less than 1%). Hence, even if the cost of some of Arachne’s aspect language con-
structs might seem high, they are largely amortized in real applications. To give a
typical example observed on our experimental platform: in case of a cache hit, a
3.8-MB page was retrieved in a single second, the time spent in prefetching ad-
vices amounted to 1801 µsec, and the time spent within Arachne to execute the
hooks and dynamic tests was 0.45 µsec. In a miss case, on the average, a client
Table 2. Performance comparison between manual modiﬁcation and Arachne, for
prefetching policy integration in Squid
Arachne Manual
Top1 Top1 Diﬀ
Top2 Top2 (%)
Throughput
(request/s)
5.59 5.59
–
5.58 5.59
Response
time (ms)
1131.42 1146.07
1.2 – –1
1085.31 1074.55
Miss response
time (ms)
2533.50 2539.52
0.2 – 1.8
2528.35 2525.34
Hit response
time (ms)
28.96 28.76
–0.6 – 3.8
30.62 31.84
Hit ratio
59.76 59.35
–0.6 – 0.7
61.77 62.22
Errors
0.51 0.50
–1.9 – 0
0.34 0.34
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retrieved the same page in 1.3 seconds, 16679 µsec were spent in the advices and
0.67 µsec within Arachne itself.
6.3 A Second Case Study: wu-ftpd
We also applied Arachne on the real-world application wu-ftpd (Washington
University ﬁle transfer protocol Daemon), a widely deployed ﬁle transfer protocol
service. It constitutes the basis for development of several other ftp servers, e.g.,
BSD ftpd, ProFTPD.
We performed measurements on wu-ftpd applying an aspect for the correc-
tion of a buﬀer overﬂow. We chose a buﬀer-overﬂow vulnerability identiﬁed in
the s/key authentication mechanism discovered in 2004 and referenced by the
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures under the identiﬁer CVE-2004-0185.
In order to evaluate wu-ftpd’s performance, we used dkftpbench [48], a
benchmarking tool for FTP servers. dkftpbench permits users to stress ftp
servers by faking client connections using automata. Each fake client authen-
ticates to the server, retrieves a particular ﬁle and disconnects. dkftpbench
constantly creates new automata and then permits users to measure instant/av-
erage/maximum numbers of simultaneous users. We recorded our measurements
between two machines: one for dkftpbench and one for wu-ftpd over a 100-Mb/s
ethernet. wu-ftpd was running on a Pentium 4, 3.3 GHz, with 512-MB RAM.
Each ﬁle to be retrieved was 5-MB long, and network bandwidth dedicated to
each client was set so that the network was never subject to congestion.
We measured the maximum number of users simultaneously served by wu-
ftpd when running unprotected and protected with our aspect. Results show
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two versions, which allow for 1008 and
1012 simultaneous users, respectively. This demonstrates that even if our aspect
constructs might seem to consume an important amount of local resources, they
are clearly reasonably applicable in real-world situations by permitting users to
protect applications against attacks without impacting performance signiﬁcantly.
Nevertheless, performance penalties could be signiﬁcant. Indeed, frequent
use of the read construct could greatly slow down program execution. Such
a situation would arise, for example, when every single buﬀer in an applica-
tion should be protected from overﬂowing. However, one of the main char-
acteristics of our approach is that it supports the selective modiﬁcation of
system-level applications using aspects. Furthermore, those situations seem to
be quite unlikely anyway: for all applications we have encountered, read/write
and readGlobal/writeGlobal pointcuts have been marginal compared to call
pointcuts.
7 Related Work
Aspect-oriented research currently focuses on object-oriented languages. Apart
from µDyner and Arachne, there are few aspect weavers for C (or even C-like
languages). AspectC [3] and AspectC++ [49] are two noteworthy exceptions.
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They both rely on source-code transformation and solely weave aspects at com-
pile time. DAC++ [50] and Toskana [51] are dynamic weavers for C++ and C.
DAC++ is built around a metaobject protocol enabling the run time instru-
mentation required to weave aspects at run time. Since C++ does not include
a standard metaobject protocol, the base program has to be compiled with
a dedicated speciﬁc compiler. Toskana weaves aspects in a running Linux kernel.
It does not allow users to weave aspects in user applications. In addition, the
joinpoint model in Toskana is limited to function calls. Hence, none of these
weavers is suitable to modularize and dynamically compose the concerns we
considered.
There is quite a large body of work now on the notion of expressive aspect
languages, where “more expressive” typically compares to AspectJ’s pointcut
and advice models. Our work has been inspired by Event-based AOP [52], which
aims at the deﬁnition of pointcuts in terms of arbitrary relations between events.
Nevertheless, many other approaches to expressive aspect languages exist. For
example, data-ﬂow relations [53], logic programming [54], process algebras [55],
graphs [56] and temporal logics [57] have all been proposed as a basis for the
deﬁnition of expressive aspect languages. However, few of these encompass dy-
namic weaving, and only the latter has been applied to C code under eﬃciency
considerations similar to our setting (but using a static approach to weaving).
Research on explicit sequence pointcuts and aspects is still in its infancy.
Sequential aspects were ﬁrst introduced by Douence et al. with the notion of
stateful aspects [37, 38]. They exploited the underlying notion of regular se-
quence aspects — which are thus of more restricted expressiveness than the
sequence aspects considered in this article — to analyze aspect interactions, and
a prototype supporting arbitrary relations between joinpoints for Java was im-
plemented [58]. However, this prototype is based on static weaving and does
not allow dynamic modiﬁcation of aspects. Regular sequence aspects have also
been integrated in the Java-based JAsCo aspect system [59]. In [60] a specialized
language was proposed to deﬁne pointcuts as sequences of method calls in Java.
A pointcut is associated with a single advice, which is executed at the end of
the sequence. This approach does not support advice attached to the middle
of a sequence. Moreover, this Java-based tool supports static source-code-only
weaving.
Another class of techniques relevant to our work is dynamic binary code in-
strumentation, which has already been widely studied. These techniques were
used in the ﬁrst computers [61]. In these techniques, diﬃculty issues range from
the complexity to rewrite binary code to the lack of a well-deﬁned relation-
ship between source code and the compiler-generated binary code. Pin [62] and
Dyninst [63] enable programmers to modify any binary instruction belonging to
an executable. Based on a just-in-time translation, Pin is very eﬃcient but is lim-
ited to insert code before or after a binary instruction of the base program. This
prevents Pin from serving as a back end for an aspect system using around-like
aspect. Dyninst does not suﬀer from this limitation; it is designed around the
Unix debugging API: ptrace. After suspending the base program execution, this
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API allows a third-party process to read and write the base program memory.
In comparison, Arachne suspends the base program at most once to inject, with
ptrace, its kernel DLL into the base program process. In addition, instrumen-
tation schemes written with Dyninst are not ensured to be reliable: Dyninst’s
implementation relocates several adjacent instructions. Since one of the relocated
instructions can be a branching instruction target, the instrumentation success
depends on the base program considered. In comparison, Arachne’s joinpoint
model has been devised to avoid these kind of issues by design.
Finally, there are many Java-based approaches to nonstatic code weaving,
i.e., dynamic weaving and load-time weaving. Load-time weaving refers to the
process of instrumenting the base program when the execution environment
— the Java virtual machine, for instance — transfers it from disk storage to
memory-executable structures. To provide aspect deployment at run time they
have to prepare, i.e., instrument, the base program at load time and thus can
imply a nonnegligible overhead, even in the absence of aspects [64, 65, 66, 67].
Contrary to those approaches, Arachne does not weave aspects at load time
but dynamically at run time and does not require any anticipation of aspect
weaving at load time. Furthermore, Arachne keeps a clear separation at run
time between the base program code and the aspect code, so that aspects can be
unwoven without leaving residues in the base program code. Some approaches,
most notably JAsCo [68], Steamloom [69], JBoss AOP [70], Spring AOP [71]
and AspectWerkz (which is currently under integration with AspectJ) support
run-time weaving of aspects for Java. As Java-based approaches they cannot be
applied to solve the legacy code problems we consider. Furthermore, they do
not provide Arachne’s ﬁne-grained weaving (weaving on the level of processor
instructions). Finally, since they rely on particularities of the Java platform
(such as the debugging interface or Hotswap), the incurred performance overhead
is large to very large compared to that of Arachne, and the implementation
techniques themselves are not transferable to C.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
Technical issues such as double-free bugs and buﬀer overﬂows, networking, and
prefetching are typical examples of concerns which crosscut system-level C ap-
plications: in many real-world legacy applications such as the Squid Web cache,
these concerns are scattered over the entire program source code. Since secu-
rity breaches and insuﬃcient resources are often discovered after deployment,
and because downtime must be avoided in many application contexts, there is a
growing need to modularize and manipulate these concerns at runtime.
Security, networking and prefetching are appealing candidates for modulariza-
tion using aspects. However, basic aspect-oriented techniques are not applicable
due to the complex relationships between executions points these aspects are
required to account for. We have proposed an aspect language enabling us
to specify these relationships involving sequences of execution points as well
as for variable aliases. We have shown how to successfully modularize security,
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networking and prefetching concerns within this aspect language. Furthermore,
we have presented two formal semantics for this language that clearly express
diﬀerent properties of the language due to their diﬀerent abstraction levels.
The Arachne tool implements this language. It can weave and deweave as-
pects dynamically in running legacy C applications like Squid or the wu-ftpd
ftp server. We have provided detailed evidence that the performance of these
two applications, including modiﬁcations by Arachne aspects, competes with
(optimal) manual source code modiﬁcations.
As future work, we intend to investigate how unexpected interactions be-
tween aspects can be detected at compile time and at weaving time. Unexpected
interactions can occur when two aspects refer to the same joinpoint or by shar-
ing variables. Detecting these interactions would greatly ease the development of
large aspects libraries. Another lead for future work is to exploit the better mod-
ularization of system-level functionalities by Arachne aspects for the testing of
such functionalities. We also plan to integrate debugging information support to
Arachne. Because this is the missing link between source and binary code, that
information should permit users to overcome aggressive optimizations performed
by compilers.
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